The Mediterranean and Black Sea: regional integration and maritime nationalism

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Abstract

Cooperation is the core mechanism in UNCLOS for the management of enclosed and semi-enclosed seas. There is a sizeable history of cooperation between the coastal States in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea based on politics and socio-economics, but conditions have changed greatly over the last 20 years. The processes of regional integration, centred, fundamentally, on the northern shore, and expressions of nationalism, including maritime nationalism, are shaping a new stage on which to strive for the cooperative system which is essential for the governance of a sea where sharp imbalances and demographic pressure that, in the short term, point to a significant worsening of environmental conditions, coexist. © 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction

In its Art. 123, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea provides for the need for cooperation between States that give onto enclosed or semi-enclosed seas. Cooperation was begun between States bordering on the Mediterranean with the drawing up in 1975 of the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP), along with a number of other legal instruments known jointly as the “Barcelona System”. The context within which the MAP’s implementation both arose and was initiated (four of the five protocols came into force before the end of the 1980s) has been subject to widespread modification, ranging from the geo-strategic stage (which at that time was dominated by political bipolarity and a doctrine of mutual destruction) to the political map of the region itself, which now contains new States, not to mention a great yet imbalanced growth in population, developments in political and military alliances (the EU and NATO) and the erosion of ideas—such as that of international solidarity—which had allowed the declaration that marine beds and subsoil be adopted as part of the Common Heritage of Mankind.

As a result of the growth of the EU, one half of the Mediterranean (the northern and eastern shores) is going down the path of greater regional integration and forcing the band of outlying countries farther and farther south. Meanwhile, in northern Africa the gap in development continues to grow (difference in GDP/inhabitant as high as 1–30 [1]) and the lack of political cohesion in the area makes its intra-Mediterranean relationships more vulnerable.

The quarter of a century that has passed since the beginnings of the MAP has borne witness to the long-drawn-out development of the III UNCLOS, the approval of the Convention (1982) and its coming into force (1994), and substantial modification to two of its sections: the Agreement relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (1995, entered into force on December 2001) and the Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the Convention (in force as from July 1996). These modifications might imply that there is a trend towards the weakening of elements that contribute to developing cooperation in an area with common resources and, on the other hand, to fostering unilateral action which, within the bounds set by the Convention (and this is already underway to a certain extent), would be perceived as greater nationalist standpoints: a greater splintering of maritime jurisdiction due to a rise in the number of States and a widening
of exclusive rights as a result of greater competition for fewer stocks.

Governance of the Mediterranean could enter a more complex phase despite there being instruments for regional cooperation in place for over 25 years. Persistent regional tensions, an increase in territorial imbalances, and the impact of activities which are undergoing great short-term growth, such as tourism,¹ may overwhelm an institutional framework that was designed in 1975. One of the elements on the new geopolitical stage is the development of the European Union (known as the European Economic Community in 1975). There were only two EU countries when the MAP was approved; in 1995 there were four and now, in 2002, the number of associated States around the Mediterranean and the Black Sea (in the process of joining) has risen to seven (Turkey, Cyprus, Malta, Slovenia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania). In the medium term, the geo-political stage of the Great Mediterranean Marine Region² has been characterized by the EU’s dominant position which is imposed, territorially speaking, by the wide-ranging yet compact presence of its maritime jurisdiction, and by greater regional integration concentrated on the northern shores. With regard to marine governance, the greater degree of political cohesion will contribute to an easier implementation of policies on cooperation, in such a way that the majority position (measured in terms of maritime jurisdictional domination [5]) will be transformed into a general advantage for the region’s governance. Nonetheless, at one and the same time the key questions of marine management continue to require a great degree of cooperation (the struggle against pollution from both marine and land sources). The policies of a less-structured, less-developed southern shore which is subject to high demographic pressure, will be less effective, and will tend to create a greater dependence on the EU through a patronage system [6]. The question that must now be asked deals with the future of governance in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea: the North–South divide, the resurgence of nationalism and ethnic antagonism, greater demographic pressure and the resulting competition for natural resources could heighten maritime nationalism, and this would lead to the disappearance of the region’s only common element: the high seas.³

The outlook facing us would, therefore, be characterized by greater regional integration (EU), a more tight-knit regional structure and the risk of maritime nationalism, which would do away with the only free and common asset in the region. Bearing this in mind, thought should be given to the validity of the model for regional cooperation that came out of the MAP.

2. The context of the Barcelona convention

Not only were both the Mediterranean and the Black Sea subject to great social and economic inequality at the time when the Mediterranean Action Plan and the Barcelona Convention came about, but they were also greatly affected by a deep split in East–West relations on account of intervention by powers from outside the region. With greater or lesser highs and lows, the tension and bipolarity of the Cold War enforced a geo-political model on the peoples that lived on the shores of the two seas that drove them to turn their backs on each other for purely ideological reasons and out of loyalty to one or other of the two superpowers (the USA and the USSR).

Despite this, given the importance of a common history in the area, the European countries from both sides of the Iron Curtain, Arab countries and other coastal states all made an effort to find ways to cooperate (North–South and East–West) outside the strict tutelage of exogenous powers. There was, needless to say, a desire for cooperation and a will to converse behind all the initiatives that attempted to convert both these seas into areas of stability that could be shared by all.

2.1. The Mediterranean, theatre of confrontation: the Mediterranean and Black Sea areas during the Cold War

1975 was crucial for the Mediterranean as not only was this when the Action Plan to protect marine habitats was established, but it was also the year when the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was held in Helsinki against a backdrop of economic and social crisis (the 1973 oil crisis). This gave a number of countries the opportunity to show a greater propensity for political dialogue and economic cooperation at a time when the crisis (1974–1975 recession) and

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¹By 2025 urban development may reach a level of 60%, with a third of the population concentrated in coastal areas. Urban population will multiply by 1.3 in the North and between 2.5 and 4.0 in the South. This will double the demand on water resources (50% in the North and 300% in the South) and on fishing resources (requirements for between 5 and 6 million tonnes with present-day catches at a little over one million tonnes). As far as tourism is concerned, by 2025 the number of visitors could surpass the overall number of inhabitants in the Mediterranean region (between 380 and 760 million visitors) [1,2].

²Adalberto Vallega refers to the joint area of the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea as the Large Mediterranean Marine Region (LMMR), stretching from the Straits of Gibraltar to the Sea of Azov and covering an area of approximately three million square kilometres [3]. For the concept of the region in UNCLOS (1982) and most especially regarding the Mediterranean region cf. also Chircop [4].

³The zone has also been notably depleted by demands made on its continental platform. This has led to the signing, since 1968, of eight bilateral agreements involving ten countries (cf: The Mediterranean Region and the Law of the Sea).
a climate of tension and dispute were starting to erode the feeling of détente of recent years.

Without a shadow of a doubt, the 1970s formed part of the so-called Cold War that since the end of the Second World War had been the cause of a split between coastal states around the Mediterranean basin and the Black Sea into allies of the United States or of the Soviet Union. One of the consequences was an almost immediate implementation of containment and military force.

The world order of the Cold War was markedly bipolar with the surface of the planet divided into a number of geo-strategic areas [7] and spheres of influence under the aegis of one or other of the two political and economic systems in dispute—capitalist democracy and communism. The region of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea was a key pawn in this game of strategy and its system of alliances. For more than 40 years it remained an area of vital importance and was the prime focus of attention for Americans and Soviets alike as they maintained their opposing standpoints, even though these changed over the course of time [8]: (i) a strongly conflicting position between 1947 and 1958 when both blocs rolled out their diplomatic weapons in order to establish pacts and alliances with the different countries; (ii) a period of détente and peaceful coexistence, especially from 1962 onwards, and (iii) a somewhat confused period from 1975 onwards, characterized by crises in economics and security systems.

In general terms, the diplomatic and military high politics waged by the United States and the Soviet Union during all this time is most clearly reflected by the presence of large fleets (V. Sovmedron, US Navy VI Fleet) and naval bases in the hands of both NATO and its allies (Rota, Gibraltar, Toulon, Naples, Heraklion, etc.), and the soviets (Latakia, in Syria, and Sebastopol on the Soviet Union’s Crimean peninsula) [9].

In spite of certain difficulties, the 1970s began in a climate of détente as is evident by the new relationship etente as is evident by the new relationship that was being established between the United States and the Soviet Union, and against the backdrop of the new polycentric international system that was evolving (triangular diplomacy Washington–Moscow–Beijing, the consolidation of the EEC, the configuration of the Third World as a Non-Aligned bloc), the opening of negotiations between Israel and Egypt after the “Yom-Kippur” war, and the Ostpolitik or western rapprochement with communist Europe, together with new advances in European integration with the “Europe of the Nine” in 1973 [8].

Nevertheless, this favourable geo-political and socio-economic context gradually started to fade away. With renewed bipolar tension, economic difficulties and the more or less failed attempts at putting new frameworks for cooperation into place (Stockholm Conference, Helsinki Conference, implementation of a New International Order...), the Mediterranean and Black Sea region went through a period of relative stability imposed, it must be said, by the two great “policemen” of the world [10]. In spite of all this, and leaving politics aside, attention can also be drawn to certain aspects which make the area suitable for international cooperation between its coastal states [3].

Firstly, the region’s non-European peoples, whose process of emancipation was practically at an end in the 1960s, begin to become aware of their socio-economic situation and, to a certain extent, frustrated by it, and this was worsened by the energy crisis in the 1970s; they are also aware of a renewed attempt at domination by developed countries (neo-colonialism) and there is a general air of dissatisfaction in the face of the world political and economic order. As a result of this, the non-European Mediterranean countries, from their position of under-development and dependency, take different, yet sometimes complementary, paths towards development and demands [8]: (a) a strategy based on the production and export of resources (mainly hydrocarbons); (b) the forming of international movements aimed at airing grievances and expressing neutrality (Non-Aligned Countries’ Movement4); (c) a bid for a more just and evenly balanced economic system (the New International Economic Order, proposed in 1973); (d) collective action (the 77 Group); and (e) international dialogue (North-South Conference, initiated in 1975).

Secondly, their Western European neighbours, who had had links with one another through the EEC since the end of the 1950s, were to undergo something of a change with the establishment of the “Europe of the Nine” (with the joining of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark), the proposal for a Global Mediterranean Policy (1972), and an attempt at counteracting the Nordic influence at the heart of the EEC with a greater and more generalized approach to Non-Community Mediterranean Countries5 [11]. Paradoxically, this Global Mediterranean Policy is based on a bilateral approach to Non-Community Mediterranean Countries. Apart from this, too much emphasis is put on economic (trade) issues which prolong the position of dependence the southern and eastern Mediterranean countries find themselves in and, in the words of Bichara Khader, a European policy of a merely paternalistic and beneficent nature [12]. The partial achievements of the Global Mediterranean Policy, insofar as a climate of accord was established in scientific, technical and economic terms, if nothing else, did not in any way assuage the general dissatisfaction or the proposals and

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4 Amongst the countries belonging to this were Cyprus, Malta, Yugoslavia and Egypt.

5 Except Libya and Albania.
demands for a Renewed Mediterranean policy that had repeatedly been heard since the 1980s [13].

Thirdly, the so-called Euro-Arab Dialogue (EAD) began in 1973 on the back of both the good climate of understanding between Europeans and Arabs that had been achieved by the Global Mediterranean Policy and events that were, to a greater or lesser extent, critical (the oil crisis, the Arab–Israeli war) [12, 13]. Although the Euro-Arab Dialogue has become somewhat bogged down in recent times, it was the first great experiment in inter-regional dialogue and cooperation in the Mediterranean area. The multilateral or collective diplomacy of the 1970s tried to create a kind of institution between the already existing supra-state blocs (the EEC and the League of Arab States), with a view to it becoming permanent, which would concentrate efforts at negotiation and dialogue on political, economic and socio-economic problems involving both Europeans and Arabs [14]. In short, in spite of the tendencies imposed upon them by the bipolar world order, during this decade the Mediterranean coastal States began to act as an endogenous force and, as such, also began to set up a regional framework for action and cooperation which provided them with a greater level of autonomy from the superpowers, greater stability (greater attention given to Europe) and more uniform development (an urgent requirement for non-European coastal States).

Fourthly, as in other areas of the world, huge attention was to be given to socio-economic, cultural and environmental questions in the region. Said low politics (as opposed to the high politics of a strategic and military type) encouraged the Mediterranean coastal States and, to a lesser extent, those of the Black Sea, to collaborate in these fields. It must be borne in mind that the 1970s was a period when third-world countries put forward demands, fought hard to make themselves heard on the international stage and to achieve a fairer economic order, and, from the epistemological point-of-view, that it was a time when a whole gamut of theories sprang up that were critical of the economic theory of capitalism (the theory of modernization, the structuralist theory, the neo-Marxist theory) not to mention proposed alternative theories (eco-development, endo-development, etc.) [15]. Serious proposals were also made for a change in the international order (the Tinbergen Report or the R.I.O. (Reshaping the International Order)). Of course, behind all of this are to be found the controversy on the limits on growth, the debate on the failure of both liberal-capitalist and Marxist hypotheses and a preoccupation with helping growing numbers of Third-World people escape underdevelopment. It was also in the 1970s when alarm bells were first heard regarding damage to the environment, which is a most important factor in the context of the Mediterranean. In the face of a strong conservationist current and, fundamentally, as a result of the United Nations

2.2. The regional development model in the 1970s

As far as the regional development model was concerned, this would be clearly split between a heavily planned economic system (in the Balkans and the Soviet area) and a capitalist system (in Western Europe and its Mediterranean periphery), and as such, certain problems were unavoidable; some, such as the oil crisis, are simply a product of a moment in time; others, like the underdevelopment of the south and discrimination against the area amongst the great economic networks, are structural.

As such, during the 1970s the Mediterranean and Black Sea area had to contend with an enormous energy crisis. The Arab countries took the decision to create an upturn in the price of crude oil as a means of putting pressure on western countries and also as a way to accelerate their own economic development. At this time, the traditional Arab oil-exporting countries of the Mediterranean basin and the Middle East proposed to undertake massive reindustrialization programmes funded by increased income provided by the rise in oil prices [17]. In this way, States such as Libya or the Gulf States began their transition from an unindustrialized, subsistence economy to a heavily industrialized one, which also meant that their economic, territorial and social structures underwent unprecedented changes. In any case, and despite the fact that the revaluation of oil constituted a real economic shock, the development model in the South and East of the Mediterranean still remained firmly stuck in backward (under-developed) structures, excessive extraversion or dependence on the export sector, and with a clear economic (and, sometimes, cultural) link to the countries of

\[\text{At the 1975 Barcelona Conference, a Convention and two Protocols associate to the Mediterranean Action Plan designed to fight marine pollution were all agreed to.}\]
Moreover, the Mediterranean countries that did not possess hydrocarbons would not only remain in a state of profound underdevelopment, but they would also have to swallow the bitter pill of paying a lot more in order to consume resources of this type. In general terms, the 1973 crisis and the later 1979–1980 crisis were to constitute a severe brake on the economic expectations of Third World countries in the region and one of the reasons why the New International Economic Order project was to fail. At the same time, the two oil crises were to act as a reminder to the EEC of the economic and strategic interest the Arab world holds for it, as well as an incentive for new political (increase in size) and economic (getting over the crisis, the Act of Union…) projects [11]. The Eastern Bloc (Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, the USSR), in retreat but with certain facilities for self-sufficiency in oil, remained unaffected by the crisis to a certain extent.

The Mediterranean and the Black Sea, which comprised countries with a very diverse economic background (an EEC that was gradually getting over the crisis and managing to remain a great economic power; a backward and dependent Arab world; a soviet sphere of influence looking over the West’s shoulder) were, in the 1970s, on the edge: the Mediterranean was on the edge of the capitalist world; the Black Sea on the edge of the Soviet Communist system. The fact that there was enormous inequality between North and South (as witnessed by the huge difference in per capita income), some importing and exporting that was hugely advantageous to Western Europe [18] and a certain productive division/specialization (primary and consumer goods in the Southern Mediterranean; industrial and quality services in Europe) paints a regional map that was fragmented, heterogeneous and excluded from the world’s principal economic networks [11,12,19].

Traditional coastal and marine uses still carried on within this general economic framework (fishing, transport and maritime trade, coastal industry, coastal urban development, naval use). Activities such as tourism, the transport of hydrocarbons and containers and offshore hydrocarbons enjoyed a steep take-off [20,21], the economic, territorial and ecological consequences of which soon made themselves felt. Nevertheless, it must be said that this boom amongst certain coastal and marine activities only happened in the Mediterranean and was not to take place in the Black Sea until the 1990s on account of the negative influence of geopolitical and economic factors during the Cold War [3].

Logically, the double split in the development model in the region (capitalism vs. real socialism; centre vs. periphery) put increasingly unbearable pressure on the marine and coastal ecosystems of both seas. It has to be remembered that there was an unprecedented increase in fishing catches in the 1970s (Section 3.2), especially in the case of the Western Mediterranean (and most especially in the Magreb countries) [22,23] and that throughout both basins the widespread phenomenon of progressive pollution from a number of sources arose: the dumping of industrial waste, urban waste, oil pollution (waste from refineries or from tankers) and radioactive contamination amongst others [3,20,22,24]. These acts of aggression against the environment, which are not new to the Mediterranean, were registered at a much later date in the Black Sea, where the old communist system has caused virtually irreparable damage to the environment and left a dramatic legacy for present-day generations [25].

It must also be mentioned that the coastal strip in the region has been subject to great demographic pressure depending, to a greater or lesser extent, on the area that is analysed. As an example, the population around the Mediterranean, which in 1950 was fixed at about 212 million inhabitants, had reached 332 million by 1980. Nevertheless, such a huge population increase tends to disguise North–South inequalities, for whilst the great countries of the north shore or Region A, as it is called in the Blue Plan (Spain, France, Italy, Greece and Yugoslavia) had annual rates of increase that were generally under 1%, the North African countries and Syria and Turkey (Region B) grew by 2.5%. This has certain inevitable important social and economic consequences in Arab countries (young population, unemployment, migration, low standard of living…), and is also reflected by the degree of urban development; Region A urban population multiplied by a factor of 1.7 between 1950 and 1980 whereas in Region B it multiplied by a factor of 3.32 during the same period [24]. This meant that although Europe managed to stem the phenomenon of urbanization (higher numbers of large cities, a larger urban population, more pressure from urban development in coastal areas) during the 1970s, huge Megalopolis and heavily populated cities also appear in countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean (Alexandria–Cairo, Algiers) and at the entrance to the Black Sea (Istanbul) [20,24]. This urban phenomenon has begun to result in a demographic concentration around a small number of nuclei in less-developed countries, as well as in urban and territorial problems and, above all, a heavy impact on the shoreline (land occupation, waste dumping, port and industrial activities, etc.).

The great geo-political, socio-economic and environmental problems that were spots on the horizon in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea of the 1970s, now
presented their coastal dwellers with a huge dilemma: cooperation, or individualism and nationalism? A great number of countries in the region are known to be demanding territorial waters and exclusive fishing zones at this time [22] (cf. Section 2.3), but it is also fair to say that the good climate of cooperation that came out of UNCLOS together with the EEC’s policies for cooperation and the establishment of a Euro-Arab Dialogue have optimized the region for North–South entente and for pacts to bring an end to conflict. These were difficult times, yet tinged with a certain air of hope and utopia.

2.3. The Mediterranean region and the Law of the Sea

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982) is a key instrument for development in the region due to the fact that the Mediterranean, on the one hand, is a semi-enclosed sea and, on the other, a focal point for the interests, aspirations and potentialities of the States that lay around its rim. For this reason, the negotiation process (1973–1982) and later development up to the point where it came into force (the Convention in 1994, in 1996 the Agreement relating to Part XI and in 2001 the Agreement on straddling stocks) are revealing of the way the States have addressed the maritime side to their “Mediterraneanity”; this condition of “Mediterraneanity” is here understood as the relationships between countries situated within a certain area when these relationships are intensified by the limitations of said area. Over such a long drawn-out period of time, ideas and ideological stand-points either developed and moved on, or were affected by historical processes of a global nature that had a decisive effect on some of the regulations governing access to the sea and its resources. As such, principles like the Common Heritage of Mankind, the Doctrine of Mutual Deterrence based on the use of nuclear weapons by the two great political blocs, and the geopolitical stage defined by an area of convergence for regions with an unequal degree of development, are all factors that have conditioned basic elements of the Convention, such as territorial dominion (the creation and/or expansion of jurisdiction), rights of property (nationalization, common heritage, free access) or rights of passage (international straits). A far-reaching process of regional change bridges the gap between the climate of cooperation found at the beginning of the 1970s, with its ongoing process of decolonization, and the aggravating nationalism of the 1990s, and this again puts the Mediterranean and the Black Sea back in the spotlight regarding the need for compulsory cooperation on marine governance.

Most of the declarations made in and around the Mediterranean and the Black Sea about the continental shelf were adopted in the 1970s (that is to say, after Geneva 1958) (Fig. 1), whereas almost half the bilateral agreements that have been reached on the area up to the end of the 1990s were drawn up in the 1980s (Table 1). In spite of this, given the large number of States around the rim, there are still many whose national legislation does not mirror the Convention’s resolutions.10

This issue highlights the peculiar situation of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea regarding the Common Heritage of Mankind (1970). Due to the nature of their physiography, there is not a large enough surface area in either of the basins for there to be any stretch of sea-bed or subsoil not already covered by respective national zones of jurisdiction that could come under a jurisdictional régime for “the area”. That claims were made at such an early stage, together with the formalization of bilateral agreements, indicates that there was expectation regarding the exploitation of mineral resources, although the point of exploitation proper had still not been reached.11 Attention must therefore be drawn to the early stage at which coastal countries began to concern themselves with adopting positions regarding future possibilities for the mineral resources. Expectations were not fulfilled with living resources and this is quite evident in the slow reaction by practically all the States to declare exclusive economic zones12, or fishing zones. With regard to territorial seas, the Convention’s negotiation period (during the 1970s) was the time that saw the highest incidence of national laws being passed, with the general acceptance of the 12 mile limit, except for Greece (6 miles) and Syria (35 miles). The jurisdictional structure of the region was therefore characterized by a certain uniformity amongst the coastal States:13 a territorial sea 12 miles wide, the non-declaration of exclusive zones (with the exception of Egypt, the Russian Federation, Romania and Bulgaria) or fishing zones (except for Algeria and Spain). The result was that there was a high-seas régime covering the majority of Mediterranean waters, but no jurisdictional area referred to as the area, as most of the countries had used the sea-bed to mark out their areas of sovereignty. As such, there was no Common Heritage of Mankind (just an area in the Mediterranean region with greater

10 As an example, Spain determined a boundary along its continental shelf with Italy in 1974 (in force in 1978) although even today there is still no national law regarding the continental shelf.

11 According to reports in the media, the seabed between Spain and Italy could be subject to oil exploration and exploitation in the near future [31]. A recent agreement between Libya and Tunisia (opposed to by Malta) similarly foresaw exploration and exploitation work being begun on the continental shelf [29].

12 Only four countries (the former Soviet Union, Egypt, Romania and Bulgaria) have set up EEZs since the Convention was approved (1982).

13 Six of the 27 States bordering on the Mediterranean and the Black Sea are still not signatories to the Convention (1982): Albania, Israel, Libya, Syria, Turkey and Morocco [32].
possibilities for the exploitation of new resources) whilst the waters remained under the régime of waters with free access. At the end of the 1990s, this situation took a new turn when Algeria and Spain adopted protectionist legislation with regard to living resources.

One of the aspects (doubly) affecting the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, as semi-enclosed seas, is access to these via straits that are used for international navigation (Fig. 2). Eight of the thirty-three straits contained in the 1957 United Nations’ Document are to be found in these seas [34]: Gibraltar, Minorca, Bonifacio, Messina, Kithera, Scarpanto, the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. Of these eight, the Straits of Gibraltar and the Turkish straits have special relevance as they are sole points of access with no alternatives. The former is especially important, not only as it represents the connection between the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean basin, but also because of the volume of

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**Fig. 1.** Mediterranean and Black Sea. Evolution of maritime claims (1930–2000). Source: [26–28].
traffic that passes through it\textsuperscript{14} [36]. Both Gibraltar and the Turkish straits were of utmost importance for both blocs during the Cold War as this area would have been one of the theatres of war (as was stated in the previous paragraph). The importance of the straits led to the regulation of their use in the Convention becoming a key factor in negotiations, and as such maritime powers made a proposal for a new régime of passage through straits compared to what had been the norm in the law of the sea until that time—passage in transit as opposed to inoffensive passage\textsuperscript{15} [38]. The acceptance of a new formula equating to freedom of passage and overflight of the waters was the bartering stick used for persuading maritime powers to accept the creation of an exclusive economic zone [39]. The standpoint of the so-called “Strait States” group was argued by Spain, at its head, although the group included seven other countries: Cyprus, Philippines, Greece, Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco and Yemen. Half the group was therefore made up of Mediterranean States, which is understandable given that a quarter of the straits listed on the above-mentioned United Nations document were situated in the area.

Another of the elements exacerbated by the unique shape of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea is the need to deliminate maritime areas between opposing and adjacent States. The template of the countries (Table 2) provides us with a total of 45 interactions or boundaries, although in reality this number is higher given that there may be more than one jurisdictional boundary between the same two countries. The complexity and political cost of the delimitation process explains the low number of boundary agreements that have been signed up to the present (Table 1).

Another characteristic that results from the nature of the region with a semi-enclosed sea is disadvantaged geographical position. States at a geographical disadvantage should be distinguished from landlocked States in the area surrounding the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Lucchini and Voelckel [40] place some 20% of disadvantaged States\textsuperscript{16} (coastal) and 25% of land-locked States around the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, but only 9% of advantaged States (Spain, Italy and Greece).

There is no strict criteria to follow in order to decide how landlocked States in the area of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea should gain access to the sea or which countries they should be dependent upon for said access. States such as Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Austria, Hungary, Macedonia, Moldavia, San Marino and Jordan might be considered as having a natural outlet to the Mediterranean given their nearness to it.\textsuperscript{17} Other more distant countries that give onto the Caspian Sea need to connect their pipelines to the Black Sea and the Mediterranean in order to provide an outlet for their oil products, and this they do by means of gas and oil pipelines. Promising reserves in countries such as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have heightened controversy over outlets for said fuel products; the only alternatives would be through Black Sea ports (Russia), the Mediterranean (Turkey), or through the Indian Ocean (Iran), which would create a new category of States, so-called transit States, through which Asian gas and oil would reach their markets by way of the new shoreline States that have come into existence in the wake of the break up of the former Soviet Union [43].

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Bilateral agreements}
\begin{tabular}{ll}
\hline
Italy/Yugoslovia (1968) & \\
Italy/Turkey (1971) & \\
Italy/Spain (1974) & \\
Greece/Italy (1977) & \\
France/Monaco (1984) CS & \\
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Tunisia (1970–1980s) CS & \\
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta (1986) CS & \\
Albania/Italy (1992) CS & \\
Turkey/Bulgaria (1997) TS,EEZ,CS & \\
Turkey/Georgia (Protocol 1997) & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\textsuperscript{14} By the year 2000, total sea-traffic through the Straits of Gibraltar had reached 84,844 vessels (28,475 ferries), with an average of some 232 vessels per day (data supplied by the local sea rescue coordination authorities headquarters at Tarifa, the “Sociedad de Salvamento y Seguridad Maritima”). The amount of traffic passing through the Suez Canal amounts to approximately 25,000 vessels per annum [35].

\textsuperscript{15} Navigation through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus straits is regulated by the Montreux Convention (1936) [37].

\textsuperscript{16} On signing/ratifying the Convention, countries such as Romania and the Ukraine have included specific declarations regarding their disadvantaged geographical position [41,42].

\textsuperscript{17} Taking into account the provisions of the UNCLOS (1982), on 22.11.1998 Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina signed an Agreement on free passage through Croatian territory to and from the port of Ploče and through Bosnia-Herzegovina (in Neum) [29].

3. The conference of Barcelona as a turning point

The Bucharest Convention took place in 1992, with the II stage of the Mediterranean Action Plan (MAP) being implemented and the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Conference taking place in 1995. All three took place in a decade when the confirmation of the gravity of environmental and economic problems demanded an efficient and unifying focus. From 1992 on (UNCED), the focus of sustainable development was to be seen as then right way to go about achieving regional equilibrium in the region in question. In spite of difficulties, both seas’ coastal states gradually took to the arduous...
task of creating the right conditions for this to be achieved. Nevertheless, the demographic, political, social, economic and cultural divide between the sub-regional blocs were to considerably hinder expectations.

In opposition to the almost utopian integrational and centripetal regional tendencies, different centrifugal forces (nationalistic and exclusivist) were to make these seas a hotly disputed area.
3.1. A new geo-political stage

With the 1990s there began a series of enormously important political events that brought about the disappearance of the previous international bipolar system. In 1989–1990 a number of revolutions in the countries of Eastern Europe brought down the communist régimes that had dominated them. Amongst the consequences were the re-unification of Germany and the disappearance of the USSR, which was replaced by fifteen republics of different ethnic composition and, not least, different ways of envisaging the future. Progressive democratization and the understanding that was to characterize international relations provided a unique opportunity for the Mediterranean and the Black Sea to become a framework-area for cooperation and a driving force for intra-European coexistence [10].

Nevertheless, these apparently fluid relations were to become progressively more complex. What had appeared to be coexistence and dialogue was now to become a hostile, confusing and unstable political medium. For many political analysts, after the fall of communism something of a situation of “strategic void” was produced with a search for new enemies and allies. In order to explain international disputes and tensions ideological factors were replaced with other more materialistic ones. Economics and resources now took centre stage throughout the world [44].

It is clear for some authors [45] that there is an evident move from the old tension between East and West (which had disappeared) to tension between the North and the South, given that the West began to see certain Arab countries as the new enemy bloc and as a new unstable and dangerous periphery (Fig. 3), both for strictly military reasons and because of economic and demographic factors (Fig. 4). The New World Order after the Gulf War is therefore characterized by:

(i) the undisputable consecration of the USA as a political and military power;
(ii) the widening of the breach between the North and the South on an economic level (as a result of globalization, the implementation of a neo-liberal capitalist model and the new international division of labour);
(iii) social difficulties (in both developed and under-developed countries, but more especially in the latter);
(iv) the complexity and tensions derived from the growing protagonism of cultural factors (ethnic, religious, nationalistic);
(v) the increasing activity of important terrorist groups (fundamentally of an Islamic nature) which have caused the collapse of the western world’s traditional faith in its security and immunity, whilst also introducing a new destabilising element in areas such as the Middle East and Central Asia, which are alongside our area of study.

The new international system that sprang up in 1989–1990 and which had been quite fluid and flexible at the beginning, has become increasingly complex as the decade has gone on with the progressive lining-up of widely different groupings of States and international players [50]: market democracies (the Western World), in a clearly dominant position; States in transition (Russia and other Eastern European countries); rogues or rejectionist States (Libya and Serbia, for example), in an evident position of anti-western “rebeldry”; failing States (Bosnia, Algeria), in need of humanitarian aid; transnational companies (that are unarguably at the head of globalization); transnational outlaws (international crime syndicates, terrorist organizations, etc.). This heterogeneous mixture has been driven by four global tendencies of the first-degree [50]:

1. rapid globalization (of economics and information), driven by market democracies and transnational companies;
2. progressive democratization that has drawn the States in transition towards the West and has helped to create a climate of dialogue in the region under study, although it has also been the indirect cause of:
3. a certain ethnic and nationalistic fragmentation (despite globalization), which has led to the appearance of new States (Fig. 3) and potential or real conflicts, especially in the less politically stable countries of the region;
4. new proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, especially dangerous in unstable countries, in countries in transition or those that are in dispute with or rebel against Western domination.

The most prophetic have even wished for a return to bipolarity, to be represented, in this case, by a latent stand-off between the western world and a Russia which is not benevolent to Eastern European countries or the Balkan States coming under the sphere of influence of NATO and the Western European Union (WEU)18 [51–53].

With things as they are, and bearing in mind that relative tensions have increased around the Mediterranean and the Black Sea (conflicts in Yugoslavia, disputes between ex Soviet republics, the Algerian crisis, tension between Greece and Turkey in Cyprus and the Aegean, the Middle-East question, the rise in maritime nationalism with the continuation of traditional territorial disputes [54] as well as a rise in the number of

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18 WEU maintains political dialogue with the Magreb countries (with the exception of Libya) and Egypt and Israel in the South and East of Europe. NATO also includes Jordan in its dialogue. In the European sphere, WEU and NATO hold agreements of association with Central European countries (amongst which Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic have been members of NATO since 1999) and have opened political dialogue with the Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania and some of the ex Yugoslav republics.
unilateral claims for exclusive fishing zones... (cf.: *The States and the Sea*), and that new neighbour-States have appeared in the region (republics born out of the former Yugoslavia and USSR) (Fig. 3) and that policies for cooperation both on a political and economic level (Renewed Mediterranean Policy) on the one hand, and on an environmental level (the Barcelona Convention) on the other, have become bogged down, there is great need for a radical change in the region’s political framework.

The geo-political area in which we have moved in since the 1990s has been fundamentally characterized by the presence of an integrated and powerful European Union in the North that has serious intentions of intervening in the region: in the Mediterranean, through its role in the Barcelona Convention and the GFCM (General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean) and political dialogue between WEU and Non-Community Mediterranean Countries, with ongoing talks on the joining of Turkey, Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia [55] and with more determined intervention in the Middle East and the Balkans; in the Black Sea, through dialogue with Bulgaria and Romania on the subject of security and their joining the EU, politico-defensive dialogue with the Ukraine and Russia, the establishment of so-called common strategies regarding Russia and the Ukraine [56] and agreements of association and cooperation with Georgia and other States that belong to the Community of Independent States (C.I.S.) [57]. At the same time, non-EU areas in the region are suffering from the difficult transition to democracy and a market economy, underdevelopment, internal crises and the temptations of authoritarianism on the part of some governments.

In short, the region’s greatest challenge is to address, in the most integrative way possible, what Khader refers to as the “3 Ds”: Demography, Development and Democracy [11], given that the fields of demography, economics, political (and environmental) ideology are today regarded as the greatest (non-military) threats to European security [19,58].

The demographic divide, which is clearly visible in the region, has fashioned areas of different population behaviour (Fig. 4): a European area (including Slovenia...
and Malta) with annual growth rates of under 0.5%, a Mediterranean area with a rate that varies between 1.6% in Tunisia and 2.72% in Syria, and an area around the Black Sea and the Balkans (Bulgaria, Croatia, Georgia, Romania, Russia, the Ukraine), with a negative growth rate. This situation correlates to the percentage of growth in urban population, which these days is much greater in countries such as Syria, Algeria, Turkey and Morocco, and very low in European countries [48,49]. This means that the urban phenomenon is not now exclusive to the developed western world, but something that is widespread throughout the non-European part of the Mediterranean (Israel, the Lebanon, Libya, Turkey,...) (Fig. 4), as a result of which the series of impacts on the coast is also spread throughout the region as a whole.

This demographic scenario shows a large increase in the Mediterranean’s Arab population [56], and is becoming one of the central issues in foreign policies as well as security and cooperation. This is because, in the first instance, demographic growth does not go hand in hand with the appropriate economic development, which results in frequent outbreaks of social violence. Secondly, the only means of escape for the huge numbers of young Arabs who reach working age (apart from revolutionary and fundamentalist ideologies) is emigration to Europe, which has social and cultural effects that are not always positive [19,59].

With regard to the economy, bearing in mind that the annual growth in the GNP has been greater in the Magreb countries and Turkey, it can be unequivocally stated that the present scene is still profoundly unfair and unequal, with an EU with a per capita GNP that exceeds $12,000, an impoverished Magreb and Mashrek (under $5000) and States in transition whose economy is equally deficient (Georgia, Russia, Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia do not exceed $4600) [48,49]. This situation obviously gives Non-Community Mediterranean Countries an argument for developing an expansion policy regarding their maritime jurisdiction, which would then allow them to have access to new resources or exclude outsiders; for them to establish a production model which is not always sustainable, preying on land and sea resources and ecosystems, as well as for them to desperately try to get the EU’s cooperation in the fields of finance, trade and technology. This economic context, which had been taking shape in the Mediterranean area since the 1970s, was to be the one in which the ex communist countries were to sink or swim from the 1990s. These States, which are undergoing demographic regression and have a means of production that is inefficient and the cause of huge environmental
disasters, today address their future by trying to reactivate their naval and trade activities through shipping lines that link them to the Mediterranean (Fig. 5), the relaunch of hydrocarbons production and export, and the laying of foundations for a certain amount of tourist development in the Black Sea [3].

After several decades of financial dependence on the European Union and unequal trade relations, the Non-Community Mediterranean Countries are still facing huge economic challenges [62]: the creation of employment; self-defence in the face of globalization (of investment, of trade and of production); a decrease in financial resources, in food resources and natural resources (basically water and energy). Something similar is happening in the States in transition. As if this were not enough, as we shall see in the following Mediterranean and Black Sea ecosystems are suffering from an often unbearable deterioration of the environment, and a fragile environment could be a hindrance to achieving a state of balanced and sustainable development. This new concept, which also became popular in the 1990s (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), is now beginning to be incorporated into meetings, agreements and documents on a regional scale.

As if this were not enough, as we shall see in the following Mediterranean and Black Sea ecosystems are suffering from an often unbearable deterioration of the environment, and a fragile environment could be a hindrance to achieving a state of balanced and sustainable development. This new concept, which also became popular in the 1990s (Rio de Janeiro, 1992), is now beginning to be incorporated into meetings, agreements and documents on a regional scale.

The new geo-political stage is characterized at one and the same time by a situation of change (from bipolarity to the present-day “turbulence”), of contradiction (globalization vs. fragmentation) and of continuity (structural problems of a socio-economic nature) [63]. It is interesting to point out that the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, whilst both similarly faced with the steamroller of globalization and a tendency towards disintegration (both of which erode the sovereignty of States), may find the region to be a suitable instrument for new international relations and for a more flexible and effective governance of the region. As such, the process of regional cooperation (as reflected in conventions that deal with the protection of the environment and the development of both seas, and the economic association of the EU with Mediterranean and Black Sea countries) does not represent an end in itself, but rather a means to the end of achieving political and economic stability in the region as a whole [64]. Therefore, the platform of association and co-development adhered to by the EU from 1994–1995 is, in our point-of-view, in the interests of the Euro-Mediterranean area for the future, as are all the regional and local initiatives designed to establish common strategies [65]. Nevertheless, it should also be stated that the new association that is underway should in no way overlook aspects of regional security (it should not be forgotten that there are still some unresolved conflicts) [66], questions of human rights, cultural cooperation and, not unnaturally, the most social side to economic development. If European policies of a purely paternalistic, beneficent and market nature are not superseded, the region will continue to suffer the defects and problems of old [67].

Finally, it is necessary to insist on the need for setting up, with the utmost support possible, the whole
framework of environmental protection and sustainable development that arose from the Barcelona System (MAP-phase II, New Convention and amended protocols). The same should be done regarding the Black Sea and the Bucharest Convention (1992), for, although there is no connection between them, together they can give rise to a renewed and prosperous climate of cooperation in both basins. In both cases a cash injection and political support from the EU will be as inevitable as they are necessary. These are complicated times, and mutual support is a scarce commodity these days.

3.2. The states and the sea

The turnaround in Mediterranean relations in the mid-1990s came with the holding of the Barcelona Conference, which coincided with the beginning of a new phase in the development of UNCLOS (1982). Thus ended a long negotiation and reform process regarding the Convention. A new stage then began, and its biggest challenge was to make use of the instruments that the international community had conferred upon itself for regulating the use of the sea by applying them to specific issues. In the Mediterranean, this new stage of UNCLOS coincided with the launching of MAP II, which is now regarded as an instrument for sustainable development [1]. In order for this new stage to be successful, it is of prime importance that the political framework for Mediterranean relations, including economic relations, should allow the objective of sustainable development to be attained. For sustainable development to be attained, the development of countries on the southern shore and countries in transition is an absolute priority and is essential for marine governance. The Mediterranean and the Black Sea, with their unequal development, form a paradigmatic region where conflicts over the exploitation of the sea and its conservation must be solved.

Art. 123 (UNCLOS, 1982) exerts coastal States that give onto an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea to cooperate on issues such as exploration and exploitation of the sea’s living resources, the protection and conservation of the sea, and marine scientific research. Given that most Mediterranean and Black Sea coastal States are signatories to the Convention (23 out of 26) and that, at one and the same time, all the coastal States in the Mediterranean and Black Sea basins participate in their respective Action Plans within the United Nations’ Regional Seas Programme, management of fisheries resources and protection and conservation policies can at least count on an institutional framework through which the aforementioned objectives can be achieved. The following analyses some of the aspects of fisheries activities and environmental policies that afford an evaluation of the viability of effective governance of these issues in an area with such divergent interests.

As a region, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea (FAO Statistical Area 37) possess certain peculiarities from both an oceanographic and a strictly fisheries point-of-view. Unlike most fisheries in the world, since 1950 this area has been going through a period of sustained increases in catches and showing remarkable resistance to the great fishing effort it has been subject to in spite of an absence of management measures in the majority of countries [69]. Nevertheless, the situation is far from being uniform throughout the area. As far as resources are concerned, the Black Sea has seen the collapse of some of its stocks (anchovy, sprat) on account of the sharp decline of its estuarine environments; on the other hand, there is a huge imbalance in the regional structure of the fishing industry, which is a true reflection of the region’s socio-economic situation. Another widespread feature of the region related to its jurisdictional situation is the scarcity of fleets from outside countries in a sea where, unlike other seas and oceans, the majority of the waters are still regarded as high seas (Fig. 6) summarizes the situation, with two large groups being discernible: EU countries, on the one hand, and all remaining Mediterranean countries on the other, virtually have an even share of total catches (EU member countries an average of 40% during the last decade). The problem is that only four of the countries are members of the EU (Spain, Italy, France and Greece) in contrast to 22 non-members [72]. This steep

22A system of semienclosed basins that includes Atlantic water masses in the western Mediterranean, barely moderately warm and hypersaline in the eastern basin, with hyposaline waters in the Black Sea and cold waters in the Azov Sea [69].
23Fleets from other countries such as Japan, China Taiwan, Korea and Panama basically devote their attention to fishing great pelagians, but although they only account for less than 1% of total catches, their effect could be significant as they concentrate on a small number of species.
24Fish-product import and export values reflect the region’s internal imbalance and, more especially, the differences found between EU member-States and non-member-States. There are 10 Mediterranean and Black Sea countries in the world’s top 50 importers by value: the four EU member-States, plus the Russian Federation, Israel, Egypt, Turkey, the Ukraine and Yugoslavia. But in the world top 50 exporting countries (by value) only five are from the region, and of these four are the EU member-States. The 15 other countries that do not make the top 50 only account for 0.5% of imports by value and 6% of exports, if Morocco is included, and the overall exports of a
internal imbalance in the region is also noticeable when total catches of countries exceeding 100,000 tonnes are compared: only four countries, three EU member-States plus Turkey, account for 71.2% of all catches in FAO’s Area 37. In contrast to this, the southern shore countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, the Lebanon, Syria, Malta and Cyprus) barely account for 20.5% of the total even though their population makes up 40% of the region’s total population\(^2\) (Fig. 7).

Grave internal imbalance, apart from North-South relations, also affects countries currently in transition to a capitalist system, where the fisheries sector has been hard hit by the economic crisis. Whereas in 1988 Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, the Russian Federation and the Ukraine accounted for 18.5% of Area 37’s fisheries production, this had fallen to 4.3% by 1997\(^7\). Although the Mediterranean is maintaining constant production with greater stability, the Black Sea is markedly variable as a result of two crises coinciding with each other, one economic and the other, environmental \(^7\). Nevertheless, the tourist population’s great demand for fish products makes a reduction in catches foreseeable in the near future, and this in spite of the increase in productivity brought about by the greater level of nutrients that in recent years has flowed into the sea from the network of small rivers and streams on its northern banks, although this has also had an adverse effect on biodiversity, has provided a higher level of nutrients in recent years\(^6\) \cite{74}.

This is, perhaps, the most characteristic problem of the environmental situation found in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, as semi-enclosed seas, and results from, or is a consequence of, effects that originate in countries that are not, strictly speaking, coastal in nature. As semi-enclosed seas, their pollution “retention-time” is very long, 80 years for the Mediterranean and 140 for the Black Sea \cite{75}. This problem is heightened in the case of the latter by the fact that large rivers that run through a wide area of Europe, including 17 countries with a population of some 160 million people, flow into its basin (the Danube, Dnieper and Don) \cite{73}. The political and economic crisis of Black Sea countries in transition has helped to aggravate the environmental crisis caused by the aforementioned problem of a nutrients increase combined with a high level of pollution, overexploitation of resources and

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\(^{25}\)Not including the population of the Russian Federation.

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\(^{26}\)According to the FAO document \cite{69} the shelf’s productivity figures per square kilometre increased sharply between 1971 and 1989: Western Mediterranean (2.4–3.4 t/km², 1971); Balearic Islands and Gulf of Lion (5.25–6.43 t/km², 1989); Black and Marmara Seas (4.78 t/km² and 8.15 t/km²).
other chance events such as an invasion by exotic species. Many of the environmental problems that exist in the Mediterranean and Black Sea are to a large extent related to grave defects in territorial and water management and will probably be worsened by the effects of climate change. More intensive coastal erosion, the flooding of low-lying lands, the loss of wetlands and salinization have all been identified as the most probable negative effects of climate change, and these will all have a knock-on effect on agriculture, fishing, coastal and port infrastructure, coastal defence, sewerage systems and our historical heritage.

The regional or local character of many of these impacts means that response has to come on a national scale, although the “Barcelona System” and the Bucharest Convention (1992) together with the Black Sea Strategic Action Plan (1996) do contain some mechanisms that allow action to be taken in both seas. In the case of the Mediterranean, the Coastal Areas Management Programme (CAMP) provides for greater collaboration between local and governmental authorities and international financial institutions. In the same way, the Environmental and Development Observatory (MEDO) could contribute to an improvement in the understanding of the relationship between the environment and development by providing the politicians responsible for the issues with meticulous and qualified information, albeit within the very restricted sphere of action that these instruments and organisms command, and despite the fact that all their initiatives usually achieve is a number of pilot studies [1,77,78]. Nevertheless, important steps have been taken in the field of marine conservation, such as the creation of an International Cetacean Sanctuary resulting from a tripartite agreement between France, Italy and Monaco within the bounds of the new Protocol Concerning Specially Protected Areas and Biological Diversity (1995). What is new about this Protocol is that it covers all the waters of the Mediterranean, not only those that comes under national jurisdiction. The inclusion of the high seas did cause certain problems, but these were solved by means of a system similar to that in force in the Antarctic Ocean.

Facing up to the challenges that the Mediterranean has to address as a semi-enclosed sea, in the short term coastal States’ governance of marine waters and their resources is a key question that swings between two extremes. One is maintaining the present status quo, with the majority of the waters remaining under the high seas regime (especially in the Mediterranean basin, as most States have already established exclusive economic zones in the Black Sea); in such a case, fisheries management would be able to count on an existing management authority, the reformed General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM), although its greater degree of autonomy (which implies less dependency on FAO) and higher level of participation by the EU could even further weaken the position of countries in the South and the East. Even so, it is a longstanding institution (created in 1949) and this fact and its experience are fundamental to the region’s fisheries management.

When the waters come under the régime of the high seas, environmental policy can then come under an institutional framework that is already in existence (UNEP/Regional Seas Programme), but with actions taken on the high seas intensified, as has been the case with declarations made regarding the sanctuary for cetaceans. At the other extreme, the move towards the nationalization of Mediterranean

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27 The species referred to is a jellyfish, *Mnemiopsis leidyi* which was accidentally introduced into the waters among a ship’s ballast. It spread rapidly reaching a total mass of 900 million tonnes [74].

28 This evaluation of climate change in the Mediterranean area is based on eleven study cases in three phases, including the following places: the Ebro delta (Spain), the Rhône delta (France), the Po delta (Italy), the Nile delta (Egypt), the Ichkeul-Bizerte lakes (Tunisia), the Gulf of Thermaikos (Greece), the island of Rhodes (Greece), the Maltese Islands, the Syrian coast and Cres-Lošinj (Croatia) [76].

29 The sanctuary covers an area of 96,000 km² in the Ligurian Sea (NW of Italy, south of France and north of Sardinia), taking in the island of Corsica and the Tuscan archipelago [79].

30 An independent commission for the Black Sea may be created in the near future [81].
waters by establishing exclusive economic zones cannot be discarded, either. Countries such as Spain and Algeria have already taken initiatives to either enlarge exclusive fishing zones (Algeria) or to establish them [5], and other countries could follow their initiative, given that the high seas régime is currently one of the weak points of Mediterranean fishing, as pointed out in the IUCN report on the matter [74]. The standpoint the future, enlarged EU takes up on this matter will be key, as, if the present four member-States were all to establish EEZs, they would control some 56% of the jurisdictional waters, but this would be significantly increased with the joining of Turkey and Cyprus (Fig. 2) [5].

4. Conclusions

In the wake of a history of over 25 years of cooperation in matters of coastal areas and the sea itself, are the Mediterranean and the Black Sea better placed to address the challenges that the management of a basin put under great pressure by its coastal States, presents? To simplify in any way is to take a great risk in an area that is so complex from both historical and social and economic point of view. In any case, the necessary mechanisms for bringing about this unavoidable cooperation between States has to be seen in the context of the framework of political relations and against the backdrop of the multiple and swift changes that the region is undergoing. The beginning of the phase that saw the “Barcelona System” set in motion may have been driven by a certain utopian spirit which prevailed the confrontation that was brought about by a world of two opposing political systems, but the dismantling of the international order derived from the Cold War, with the greater autonomy for the region that it brought, does not seem to be leading to a point where this sea: a decline in the cooperative spirit and in collective interests to the benefit of positions that favour individual State actions and the replacement of public policies with policies governed by the free-market principle.

- The positive result of the greater regional integration on the north bank and the enlargement of the EU is a greater ability to act and control (jurisdictional domination of an enlarged EU) although it can at the same time be counteracted by more intense nationalism by non-members and the worsening of the socio-economic differential. As a lesser of two evils, greater dependence and a tendency towards a patronage system regarding the EU would be foreseeable.

The path that has been gone down since the initial PAM adoption phase and up to the phase of maturity and the adaptation of the UNCED proposals, has been tedious and laborious, with the creation of a mire of political and technical initiatives that, if no more, constitute valuable experience for addressing new challenges and transformations in the greater Mediterranean region.

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